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Introduction
Since Coase (1960), the economic analysis of contracts has been focused on their 
reciprocal nature. The literature has thus focused on transaction costs and contrac-
tual hazards (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993), incentives and commitment (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993), incompleteness, verifiability, and reference points (Fehr, Hart 
and Zehnder, 2011), and relational contracting and the value of future business 
(Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002) to explain contract features and the degree 
of discretion – for example, the choice of first-price versus cost-plus contracts 
(Crocker and Reynolds, 1993) or auctions versus negotiations (Bajari, McMillan 
and Tadelis 2009). These studies have been, nevertheless, agnostic about the impli-
cations of politics for public contract design.
In recent years, there has been increased interest in marrying economics and 
politics to understand public contracting. Public contracting accounts for approxi-
mately 12 percent of GDP in OECD member countries.1 On the other hand, public 
contracting is the government’s activity most vulnerable to waste and corruption, 
and its efficiency is a substantial component of voters’ political choices.
Public-sector and private-sector contracts have been studied extensively in their 
separate domains, but there exists no overarching theory that explains the idi-
osyncrasies of public with regard to private contracts. This gap is due, in part, to the 
difficulty in comparing contractual objects across public and private spheres, but 
also due to the limitations in accounting for political factors.
This chapter suggests tools and approaches to measure the basic features of public 
contracting and to address some fundamental research questions: Why do public 
contracts differ from similar contracts in the private sector? How do public over-
sight and political hazards affect public contracting? Do elected officials facing 
tighter political competition contract less or more efficiently than their peers in 
politically less volatile environments? These problems are (mostly) known; the 
1 OECD (n.d.). “Public procurement.” Accessed July 7, 2018 at http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/public-procurement.
htm.
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novel “twist” consists of identifying and measuring the trade-offs that arise due to 
the interaction of agents under public oversight and political competition.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section highlights particular frameworks 
that shed light on public contract design and the frictions introduced by politics. 
The third section shows political datasets and innovative techniques to collect 
novel data. The fourth summarizes the state of the art in econometric techniques 
applied to causal inference with a focus on public contracting. The fifth section 
concludes with ideas for further exploration in public contracting and behavioral 
political economics.
Theoretical frameworks of public contract design
Public contract design relates to three disciplines: public administration, industrial 
organization, and political economy. According to the public administration litera-
ture, “red tape” is associated with a large number of formal processes that appear 
to be essential to ensure the public sector’s functions. Rules and regulations are 
intended to decrease the public agents’ uncertainty about how they should behave 
(Kurland and Egan, 1999). Additionally, rules and regulations prevent abuses of 
power, protect people’s rights (Baldwin, 1990), and reflect values rooted in equity 
(Forrer et al., 2010).
In the industrial organization literature, public contract features are determined by 
informational asymmetries, the extent of the verifiability of information, and the 
presence of repeated interactions (Macaulay, 1963). When terms can be contested 
by excluded sellers, bidding specifications and agreements are carefully delimited 
with more formal features (Marshall, Meurer and Richard, 1994).
Political economists have also studied the engagement of interested parties 
(McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1989; De Figueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo, 
1999) and consumers (Prendergast, 2003) as instruments of beneficial oversight – 
that is, both honest and opportunistic challenges are costly but have positive wel-
fare effects: for example, increased competition and lower corruption.
By adding ad hoc assumptions – such as corruption, frequent renegotiation, and 
possibly conflicting objectives – the aforementioned frameworks equate public 
contracts with imperfect private contracts. Thus, political risks are (tacitly) assumed 
away or considered insignificant.
Contractual, institutional, and political data sources
The first step to and limitation of any empirical work is data collection. The Quality 
of Governance Standard Database (Teorell et al., 2018) is a panel dataset that draws 
on several freely available data sources related to the quality of governance and 
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political data such as freedom from corruption, the rule of law, and political regi-
men in more than 150 countries.2
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Database 
of Treaty-based Investor–State Dispute Settlement Cases contains more than 3300 
treaties and agreements by type of agreement, geographical region, country group-
ing, treaty status, full text, and treaty language, which can be used, for example, to 
account for disputed cases and average time to solve them.3
Cross-country empirical analysis, especially regarding institutions, raises problems 
of endogeneity and biases. Subnational data can be used to test political risk factors: 
the institutional framework is similar to all jurisdictions, and the data present suf-
ficient contractual and political heterogeneity. The US International City/County 
Management Association (ICMA) offers datasets from national surveys dating back 
to 1982 for approximately 8000 municipalities with populations of 2500 or greater 
and covers a variety of topics including service delivery and form of government 
(e.g., elected mayors and appointed managers).4
Assembling novel subnational data can certainly be a starting point and competitive 
advantage for an ambitious researcher. Complementary measures or even entirely 
novel datasets can be squeezed from (relatively) homogeneous sets of documents – 
for example, from bidding announcements, court decisions, press news, political 
speeches, web pages, online comments, and so on – using algorithmic data read-
ing and textual analysis. Despite its fancy name, these techniques are available to 
any researcher through free scripts (e.g., Python and R). Moreover, pictures and 
PDF files can easily be converted into machine-readable text with great accuracy 
using OCR (optical character recognition) packages. In the era of big data, we can 
expect that textual analysis and machine learning will play a major role in empirical 
research of contracts.5
Empirical design for public contract analysis
An analysis by The Economist6 of the keywords in working paper abstracts pub-
lished by the National Bureau of Economic Research in the last 30 years shows the 
rising importance of empirical methods for causal inference. These methods can 
usefully be applied to research on public contracts and political institutions.
2 The Quality of Government Institute (2018). “QoG Standard Data.” Accessed February 2018 at https://qog.pol.gu.se 
/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata.
3 UNCTAD (2018). “International investment agreements.” Accessed February 2018 at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/IIA.
4 ICMA (2018). “ICMA survey results datasets.” Accessed February 2018 at https://icma.org/icma-survey-research-
d atasets.
5 For more on data sources in this book see Teorell, Chapter 27 and Prüfer and Prüfer, Chapter 28 in this volume.
6 The Economist (2016). “Economists are prone to fads, and the latest is machine learning.” November 26.
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Laboratory experiments
The gold standard for causal inference is laboratory experiments. Laboratory 
experiments can serve to close the causal loop: from a theoretical model through 
empirical (but not conclusive) evidence to dissected causal inference.
Martinelli and Palfrey (2017) survey experimental political games, including elec-
tions with more than two alternatives and electoral competition and democratic 
accountability with imperfect information. This is a promising area for research on 
the role of third parties – for example, political opponents and watchdogs – on the 
contracting strategies taken by the political actors. It is arduous, however, to bring 
politicians and public managers to the laboratory to run behavioral experiments.
The limitations of laboratory experiments leave us to field interventions and obser-
vational data.
Randomized control trials
Randomized control trials (RCTs) involve randomly assigning a policy to some people 
and not to others so that researchers can be sure that differences are caused by the 
policy. The analysis, then, is a simple comparison of averages between the two groups.
RCTs have been enjoying attention and appeal to top-tier publications (see, e.g., 
Chattopadhyay and Duo, 2004). There are, however, at least three significant con-
cerns. First, the interventions are applied in a limited (controllable) area or part of 
the population, mainly in a developing country, which raises questions about the 
external validity of the results. For example, to what extent are the results from a 
procurement RCT in a village in West Africa informative about procurement in 
East Africa, Norway, or South Korea?
Second, RCTs are usually conducted in less regulated places where it is cheaper to 
carry them out. Would these same interventions in a developed country raise flags? 
Is it ethical to provide a focal and temporary intervention on a random subsample 
of the population instead of remedying the problem?
Third, by offering alluringly simple ways of evaluating certain policies in a short 
time, RCTs may tempt economists to lose sight of deeper policy questions that are 
not easily testable using RCTs, such as the effects of institutions, monetary policy, 
or social norms on contracting practices.
Propensity score matching and controls
When random variations of the independent variables of interest cannot be induced 
experimentally, researchers can harness other techniques to isolate confounding 
effects and create quasi-experimental setups. A usual technique to compare “apples 
to apples” is matching (Ravallion, 2001).
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With the increasing facility to collect data and access advanced statistical soft-
ware, matching has been receding in favor of multivariate regression analysis. If we 
stratify our data, matching places more emphasis on cells most likely to be treated, 
whereas regression places more emphasis on cells with similar numbers of treated 
and untreated cases. Matching tries to address the differences in the groups being 
compared, which it can do only to the extent that these differences are captured in 
observable characteristics. In this sense, it offers no improvement over regression, 
which also “matches” observable characteristics.
As Angrist and Pischke (2009, Ch. 3) argue, “regression can be motivated as a par-
ticular sort of weighted matching estimator, and therefore the differences between 
regression and matching estimates are unlikely to be of major empirical impor-
tance.” In this context, control variables serve to partial out the effects of observable 
characteristics on the dependent variable, so that the remaining effect is due to the 
variation of the variable of interest.
Regression analysis of contracts with rich controls can be the starting point of 
many empirical studies to substantiate theoretical claims, but falls short of causal 
inference by modern standards.
Instrumental variables
Three usual suspects blamed for blurring the causal interpretation of multivariate 
regression are omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and reverse causality. Whereas 
there is no clear technique to address the first concern with observable data other 
than to supplement the data and produce stronger common support with fixed 
effects, there are ways of solving for endogeneity and reverse causality. The tech-
niques applied in empirical institutional and contractual analysis are instrumental 
variables, difference-in-differences, and regression discontinuity design.
An instrumental variable (IV) approach induces changes in the explanatory vari-
able but has no independent effect on the dependent variable, allowing a researcher 
to uncover the causal effect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. 
Put simply, in a first stage the endogenous variable is regressed on the instrument 
(or instruments); then the predicted values of this first-stage regression are used 
in a second stage instead of the endogenous variable. If the instrument is good, the 
predicted variable contains only the variations associated with the instrument and 
not with the outcome variable or other omitted variables. This is the method used by 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) to analyze the institutions that protect citizens against 
governmental expropriation and the institutions that enable horizontal (private) con-
tracting between citizens. To circumvent the endogeneity problem, they instrument 
property rights institutions using settler mortality and population density before 
colonization, and contracting institutions by the identity of the colonizing power.
Although the IV technique is clear and sound, there is no recipe for which variables 
constitute suitable instruments – which is good news for researchers. To some 
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extent, the IV approach calls for old-school economics in the pursuit of a sound 
story and robust analysis to justify the choice of instruments. Newly accessible 
time-varying geographic information systems (GIS) – for example, aerial imagery, 
Google Trends or ESRI – can also provide food for thought.
Difference-in-differences and synthetic controls
A usual technique for causal inference is using exogenous events (e.g., law changes, 
natural disasters) that affected some subjects (e.g., some municipalities) but not 
others, and then measuring the difference of the treatment on the treated versus 
the non-treated. A standard requirement is to show that the treated and non-
treated groups before the event are similar – for example, to show a “parallel trend” 
before the event between the groups.
Moszoro and Spiller (2018) harnessed two referenda in California (failed Proposition 
26 and successful Proposition 39) regarding changes in the required supermajority 
to issue general obligation bonds as a way to assess the causal relationship between 
political hazards and the choice of municipal bond type. Moreover, instead of two 
groups being treated at different times, they have one event of interest (Proposition 
39) and one counterfactual or placebo event (Proposition 26), which constitutes 
a perfect setup for causal inference: namely, the probability of issuing a general 
obligation (GO) bond7 should remain the same after Proposition 26 failed, and 
increase after Proposition 39 was passed.
The difference-in-differences technique assumes that the change in the treated is 
only due to the treatment, and does not show how the treated subjects would have 
evolved had the treatment not taken place. A way to overcome this problem is the 
use of “synthetic controls.” For example, instead of comparing Paris to Toulouse and 
Marseille before and after an event (e.g., a change in the local regulation in Paris), one 
can construct a “synthetic Paris” as a mix of, say, 12 percent Lille, 37 percent Lyon, 
and 51 percent Strasbourg, where the weights are given by regression estimates. We 
then compare the real Paris after the event with the synthetic Paris. This technique, 
thus, encompasses a difference-in-differences plus matching and instrumenting.
Regression discontinuity design
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a technique that emulates experimental 
setups. It compares similar entities on either side of a (sharp or fuzzy) cut-off to 
gauge the effect of a treatment. If being below or above the cut-off is random, the 
effect of the treatment (e.g., different policies below and above the cut-off) on the 
treated can be claimed to be causal.
7 A general obligation bond (GO) is a municipal bond backed by the credit and taxing power of the issuing jurisdiction 
rather than the revenue from a given project. General obligation bonds are issued with the belief that a municipality 
will be able to repay its debt obligation through taxation or revenue from projects. No assets are used as collateral.
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Kantorowicz (2017) studies the causal effect of electoral systems on fiscal out-
comes using an empirical design that exploits a discontinuity in the application of 
electoral rules in Polish municipalities. In the period of 1998–2014, the national 
electoral law stipulated that the municipalities of up to 20 000 inhabitants were 
subject to majoritarian elections and that the municipalities above this threshold 
were governed by an open-list proportional system. This setting allows the use 
of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) for the comparison of municipalities 
just below and just above the 20 000 thresholds, providing a quasi-experimental 
setting for a credible evaluation of the effects of electoral regimes on fiscal policy 
outcomes.
Perspectives for research in public contracting and politics
The majority of economic studies on contracts has focused on private-to-private 
contracts. Public contracts have been seen as “special cases” of most generic pri-
vate contracts. But what makes contracting in public organizations different from 
contracting in private organizations – oversight, corruption, or multiple objectives? 
There are many issues and niches of public contracting to explore. On the theo-
retical side, we need models that address renegotiations, public accountability, and 
public managers’ choices comprehensively and convincingly.
On the empirical side, relevant policy questions could be tested: for example, the 
determinants of public-sector in-house contracts versus concessions and fixed-
price versus cost-plus contracts, the rate of renegotiations induced by contract 
design or governmental opportunism, and contractual practices in comparable 
public and private organizations (e.g., companies, universities, and NGOs) in simi-
lar functional areas (e.g., procurement and personnel management).
To analyze these policy alternatives, novel experiments and empirical tests 
should be designed. Online platforms (e.g., using Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
Prolific, and Qualtrics)8 can play a major role as laboratories without borders, 
where the pool of subjects is wider and more heterogeneous. Also, panel data 
from geographic  information systems (GIS) can become a useful source of 
instrumental variables.
Organizational discontinuities can be exploited to show the causal channel from 
political oversight to contractual practices – for example, procurement and person-
nel management. For example, many water companies in France have changed 
their organizational structure in the past: from municipal to private, and from pri-
vate to municipal. Assuming that there is organizational inertia, one could  compare 
the terms of the last auctions and job openings before privatization to the first 
auctions and job openings after municipalization.
8 See: https://www.mturk.com/, https://www.prolific.ac/, and https://www.qualtrics.com/online-sample/. Accessed 
July 7, 2018.
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The intersection of public contracting and behavioral political economics is a 
promising research area. The key to success is to find relevant setups, propose novel 
data and techniques to collect behavioral patterns, and advance empirical strategies 
that address this specific inter-sectoral relationship.
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